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Christopher Kaczor makes it plain at the outset that his book A Defense of Dignity: Creating 
Life, Destroying Life and Protecting the Rights of Conscience is a collection of his previously 
published essays. These essays have been (minimally) revised and arranged as thirteen 
chapters. Nine of the essays were published in the National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly, two 
in the journal Christian Bioethics, one in the Linacre Quarterly, several also appeared online 
and two originally appeared as chapter contributions in edited volumes (though curiously the 
title of one of the books appears as The Ethics of Organ Donation in Kaczor’s book rather 
than as its actual title The Ethics of Organ Transplantation).  
 
Kaczor says that these essay chapters “examine ethical issues related to human dignity” (p.1). 
His first chapter sets the scene by justifying human dignity, particularly the dignity that is 
intrinsic to all human beings, in response to those who argue against the usefulness of dignity 
or who reduce dignity to the exercise of autonomy. Referring to the three-fold analysis made 
by Daniel Sulmasy of dignity as attributed, as intrinsic worth and as flourishing (p.5) Kaczor 
states that these three senses of dignity “inform” the different parts of his book (p.6). His 
second chapter consolidates his justification of human dignity by arguing through the 
question, ‘are all species equal in dignity’.  Kaczor neatly demolishes arguments that claim 
appeals to human dignity are a form of discrimination by dissolving the link some attempt to 
make between speciesim and racism or sexism.  
 
The subsequent chapters demonstrate all too clearly that the book is simply a collection of 
stand-alone essays. There is no doubt that these essays are clearly argued, and Kaczor’s keen 
intellect gets to grips with opposing views and nuanced arguments. Certainly human dignity 
is implicit in his discussion. However the thread of human dignity does not seem to pull the 
collection together. Chapters 3 to 8 deal with procreation and the immediate beginning of 
human life. This is discussed in Chapter 3 in terms of equal access to fertility treatments, the 
welfare of the child and reproductive autonomy where equal respect does not entail a duty to 
do whatever a person requests. Chapter 4 deals with ‘procreative beneficence’ and the 
legitimacy of using fertility treatments in such a way as to maximise the likelihood of a child 
having a good life. Chapter 5 looks at the ethics of embryo adoption and artificial wombs as 
making “the best of an already imperfect situation” (p.66). In Chapter 6 Kaczor examines the 
ethics of dealing with persistent ectopic pregnancy, that is where foetal heart beat can still be 
detected, particularly where there is a commitment to the equal dignity of every human being. 
Using direct abortion as a reference point, Kaczor argues that in the “lively debate” neither 
salpingostomy nor the use of methotrexate need constitute direct and intentional killing of the 
embryo (p.76, p.79). To embed his conclusion Kaczor applies the theory of probablism, that 
where there are legitimate doubts an opinion can be formed that relies on probable 
application of the law even when others hold an opposite and also probable opinion (p.85). 
Chapter 7 deals with the ethics of foetal surgery as well as reduction of twin pregnancy and 
the problem of twin-twin transfusion syndrome. In the latter case Kaczor admits the difficulty 
about coming to a just conclusion especially where foetal dignity is at issue and this leads 
him on to a sharp critique in Chapter 8 of Judith Thomson’s famous violinist argument 
defending abortion even where the foetus is considered to be a person. In these chapters on 
the beginning of life certainly human dignity, particularly the dignity of the foetus, is implicit 
however the focus seems to fall more on the moral duties of parents or physicians to unborn 
children (p.29; p.39; p.90; p.105). 
 
Kaczor then moves onto problems at the end of life in Chapters 9 to 11. The tone of Chapter 
9 on faith, reason and physician-assisted suicide is markedly different in that Kaczor brings 
Scripture and the thought of St Thomas Aquinas as well as modern philosophers into the 
discussion. His analysis of the situation of the ‘pvs patient’ and Pope John Paul II’s address 
on the subject is primarily concerned with the authority of the papal teaching, whether this 
teaching is in the longstanding Christian tradition of distinguishing ordinary and 
extraordinary means of treatment, and whether artificial nutrition and hydration is required 
for pvs patients. An example of how Kaczor treats dignity as merely implicit in the discussion 
occurs in Chapter 11 on organ donation where he says that human dignity of the donor must 
be respected but the discussion is primarily about determining death.  Similarly, although 
Kaczor deals thoroughly and decisively with vexing questions of conscience protection and 
conscientious objection in Chapters 12 and 13, dignity is mentioned but it is linked to 
autonomy and freedom (p.154-155; p.174). Given that much of the debate on physician-
assisted suicide centres on interpretations of dignity in dying, and that the whole premise of 
the papal address rests on an understanding of the intrinsic dignity of all patients including 
the most profoundly disabled, it would have been useful if Kaczor had used his considerable 
analytical skills to explore dignity as attributed, as intrinsic worth and as flourishing in these 
situations. 
 
Whether or not the reader agrees or disagrees with Kaczor’s conclusions, Kaczor does make a 
strong case for his positions in each of these essays. However in this collection these essays 
would perhaps benefit from a stronger connection to the issue in question: human dignity. 
More seriously perhaps is that in common with most books on bioethical issues problems are 
grouped in terms of the beginning of life, the end of life and questions of conscience. The rest 
of life and in particular disability is either merged with the beginning and genetic testing or 
hovers around dying and death. It is in the area of disability that we need a truly robust 
defence of human dignity in all its aspects of attributed, intrinsic and flourishing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
